Postadmission Due Process for Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Children after Parham v. J.R. and Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles by Joseph, Barbara C.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 1 Fall 1979 Article 6 
1979 
Postadmission Due Process for Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded 
Children after Parham v. J.R. and Secretary of Public Welfare v. 
Institutionalized Juveniles 
Barbara C. Joseph 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Barbara C. Joseph, Postadmission Due Process for Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Children after 
Parham v. J.R. and Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 129 
(1980). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COMMENT
POSTADMISSION DUE PROCESS FOR
MENTALLY ILL AND MENTALLY
RETARDED CHILDREN AFTER
PARHAM v. JR. AND
SECRETAR Y OF PUBLIC WELFARE v.
INSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES
To a great extent, parents have been legally autonomous in deciding
what is in their child's best interest.' Legislatures and judicial bodies have
traditionally interfered with parental control only when parental actions or
omissions were obviously detrimental to the child's welfare.2 In recent
years, however, the courts have begun to recognize the independent rights
and interests of minors as factors to be balanced against parental control
over the upbringing of a child.3 When faced with severe deprivations of a
1. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents in freely exercis-
ing their religion may remove their children from public school prior to the state's compul-
sory attendance age); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state may not require
children to attend public schools if parents wish to send them to private schools).
2. Child abuse is an area where the state has traditionally intervened to protect the
interests of the child. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 205 Cal. App. 2d 437, 23 Cal. Rptr. 118
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Nebgen v. State, 47 Ohio App. 431, 192 N.E. 130 (1933); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978-79); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§
2201-2224 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-80). See generally V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED
CHILD (1964); Areen, Intervention Between Parent & Child A Reappraisal of the State's Role
in Child Neglect andAbuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Wald, State Intervention on Be-
half of Neglected Children.- Standardsfor Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring
the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV.
625 (1975); Symposium - The Medical, Legislative, & Legal .4spect of Child Abuse and Ne-
glect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 445 (1978).
For other examples of state intervention, see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), afj'd, 535 F.2d 1245, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (juvenile
curfews); Republican College Council v. Winner, 387 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (drinking
age laws); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952)
(blood transfusions); In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (abortion under
parents' compulsion); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. 1969) (sterilization).
3. The traditional view was expressed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925):
The fundamental theory of liberty. . . excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
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child's physical liberty, for example, the judiciary has found minors enti-
tled to due process of law4 and has turned to the difficult task of deciding
what kinds of procedures are constitutionally sufficient.5 Near the center
of controversy has been the commitment of minors to institutions for the
mentally ill and the mentally retarded at the request of their parents.
"Voluntary" commitment procedures in most states allow parents to
commit children under statutory age to institutions for the mentally ill and
the mentally retarded upon medical recommendation.6 As part of the in-
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.
As expressed in Pierce, parental control was not an interest or concern to be reckoned with,
but a "right" with undefined limits. After Pierce, however, courts began to focus on the
independent rights of the child. Generally, this was an easy task since the conflict of inter-
ests was most often between the child and the state rather than the child and the parent.
Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (state
cannot infringe child's first amendment rights) with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (statute requiring parental consent to minor's abortion infringes the minor's
privacy right).
4. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was. the seminal children's rights case. In
finding juveniles entitled to formal due process protections when faced with incarceration,
the Court exposed the myth of "benevolent" informal juvenile proceedings and clearly
stated that children were people with constitutional rights. Id at 47. See generally Lefstein,
Stapleton & Teitelbaum, Yn Search of Juvenile Justice. Gault and its Implications, 3 L. &
Soc'y REV. 491 (1969); Symposium on Juvenile Problems.- In re Gault, 43 IND. L.J. 523
(1968); Symposium on the Gault Decision, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1967); Comment, In re Gault: Chil-
dren Are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204 (1967).
5. Due process is a flexible concept whereby procedural protections are tailored to the
particular situation at hand. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Court
has often found that the process due cannot be divorced from the ultimate decision and that
judicial hearings are not mandated in every situation. See, e.g., Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). For a discussion of the procedural protections afforded
when formal hearings are mandated, compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (no-
tice and informal hearing normally required prior to suspension from school); Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1973) (person cannot lose "good-time" without advance
written notice, reasons, and opportunity to present evidence, but no right to counsel or cross-
examination and confrontation) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (termi-
nation of welfare benefits requires notice, hearing, opportunity to be heard, reasons, and
impartial decision maker).
6. In most states, the parent or legal guardian may commit the child without his con-
sent. There is generally no conclusory review of the parental decision other than an exami-
nation by a physician, and the child may be subject to an indeterminate stay with release
available only upon parental request or clinical decision. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6000 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979) (minor may leave the institution after completing
normal hospitalization departure procedures and giving notice); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-512
to -513 (1973 & Supp. 1978) (minors-less than 18); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1, .2, .3 (1971)
(minors less than 18); KAN. STAT. 59-2905 to -2907 (1976) (minors less than 18, but prior to
hospitalization parents or child must be informed in writing of the child's rights and types of
treatment available); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:57C (West 1979) (minor may object to his
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creased concern about due process protections for juvenile delinquents7
and for involuntarily committed adults,8 several fourteenth amendment
cases were brought challenging "voluntary" commitment proceedings for
both mentally ill and mentally retarded children. 9 One federal court
granted minors facing "voluntary" commitment a full range of procedural
protections, including notice, counsel, a probable cause hearing with con-
admission, and upon receipt of a valid objection the director of the facility shall release the
minor within three days unless involuntary commitment proceedings initiated); MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 10(a) (West Supp. 1979) (prior to admission, parents offered opportu-
nity to meet with an attorney); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-103(c) (Supp. 1978) (minors less
than 18); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 1978) (minors less than 16); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-04 to .1-06 (1979) (right to release upon application of the child);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 184 (West Supp. 1979) (right to release conditioned on judg-
ment of attending physician); S.C. CODE § 44-17-310 (1976) (minor less than 16); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 33-601 (1977) (for minors less than 16, but minors cannot be admitted for
more than six months in any 12-month period without approval of admissions review com-
mittee); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 72.23.070(2), (3) (1978) (for minors less than 13).
In some states, the physician recommending admission is not even required to be a psy-
chiatrist, and family doctors have often taken on this role. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
47.30.020 (1975); WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106(a)(1)(ii) (1977).
State statutes also make distinctions on the basis of age as to the amount of due process
protections afforded the child and the requirement of his or her consent to institutionaliza-
tion. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 66-318, -326 (Supp. 1979) (parent may admit child under 14,
but child over 16 may obtain his or her own release).
7. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). For a historical
development and survey of state juvenile statutes, see Comment, "Delinquent Child'" A Le-
gal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352 (1969); Note, The Dilemma of the
"Uniquely Juvenile" Offender, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 386, 387-89 (1972). See also N.
KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 102-68 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (D. Hawaii 1977); Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.
Neb. 1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975). See generally Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutional-
ization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1975); Ochberg & Brown,
Mental Health and the Law- Partners in Advancing Human Rights, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 491
(1974); Symposium - Mental Illness, The Law and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW.
367 (1973); Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior As a Constitutional Requirement for Invol-
untary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977); Note, Donaldson,
Dangerousness, And the Right to Treatment, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F.
Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977);
Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). See generally Note, The Mental
Hospitalization of Children and the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186 (1978);
Note, Parental Powers in the Voluntary Commitment of Children to Mental Institutions, 17
WASHBURN L.J. 595 (1978); Note, Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Penn-
sylvania, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 535 (1977).
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frontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and a standard of proof of
clear and convincing evidence.' In Parham v. J R. and Secretary of
Public We/fare v. Institutionalized Juveniles,'2 however, the Supreme Court
curtailed these lower court developments by finding sufficient a determina-
tion by a "neutral factfinder," that a child has met the statutory require-
ments for admission prior to institutionalization by his or her parent. With
the exception of some type of "independent" periodic review during the
course of a hospital stay, the Court left open what postadmission proce-
dures would adequately protect the juvenile patient's liberty interest.' 3
This comment will discuss postadmission due process for mentally ill
and mentally retarded children who have been institutionalized by their
parents. The permissible parenspatriae'4 interest of the state will be ex-
plained and balanced against the child's liberty interest and parental con-
trol over the child's activities. Special factors in determining appropriate
postadmission procedures for specific groups of children will also be iden-
tified by comparing the needs and rights of the mentally ill and mentally
retarded and of the young and very young child. '5
I. CIVIL COMMITMENT UNDER THE STATE'S PARENS PATRIAE Power
It is well settled that the state's power to deprive a person of his or her
liberty through institutionalization "must rest on a consideration that soci-
10. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded,
431 U.S. 119 (1977), on remand sub nom. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979). Other federal courts
indicated that due process protections were necessary in "voluntary" commitment proceed-
ings but were less specific about the particular protections needed. See, e.g., cases cited in
note 9 supra.
The purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the child is mentally ill or
mentally retarded, and in need of a restrictive setting. The district courts in both Kremens
and Parham found the state procedures before them inadequate for making these determi-
nations. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 459 F. Supp. 30, 45 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Bartley v. Kremens, 402
F. Supp. 1039, 1053-54 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Ii. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
12. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
13. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2511 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institution-
alized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 n.9 (1979).
14. The term parenspatriae refers to the quasi-sovereign interest the state possesses in
which it assumes a role apart from that of the individuals affected in order either to protect
individuals or compel them to act in ways beneficial to society. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972). For a discussion of the role of parenspatriae in commit-
ments, see text accompanying notes 18-29 infra.
15. See note 6 supra.
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ety has a compelling interest in such deprivation." 6 In criminal proceed-
ings, for example, this authority is based on the state's police power. Civil
commitment proceedings, however, have traditionally been authorized
under an application of either the police power, if the person is dangerous
to others,' 7 or the benevolentparenspalriae power, if the person is danger-
ous to himself or in need of treatment or habilitation.
I8
16. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
As the Court stated in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), "[Miere public
intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physi-
cal liberty." In its most recent term, Chief Justice Burger reemphasized the caution neces-
sary in the commitment context when he stated:
[A]t one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which
might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but
which is in fact within the range of conduct that is generally acceptable. Obviously
such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and surely none for confinement.
Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809-10 (1979).
The requirement of a compelling state interest when there is a potential for a severe depri-
vation of fundamental rights is found in many other contexts. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (abortion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (free exer-
cise of religion).
17. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202
S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974). See generally DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND
MENTAL HEALTH (C.J. Frederick ed. 1978); A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A Sys-
TEM IN TRANSITION 25-40 (1975).
18. Changes in civil commitment proceedings have reflected a disillusionment with the
prevailingparenspatriae justification for committing individuals. See Coleman & Solomon,
Parens Patriae "Treatment" Legal Punishment in Disguise, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345
(1976). The question has arisen whether an individual committed for mental illness has a
constitutional right to treatment, or if mentally retarded, a constitutional right to habilita-
tion. This quidpro quo view has been accepted by only a minority of federal courts. See,
e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a ffd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974) (the Constitution guarantees that persons
civilly committed to state mental institutions have a right to treatment). But see O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (no absolute right to
treatment for mentally ill); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'don
other grounds, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (civil commitment of the mentally ill without treatment is
not necessarily an impermissible excercise of governmental power). For a discussion of the
theories underlying the quidpro quo concept, see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies
Used to "Treat?" "'Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 616, 641-45 (1972). For a discussion of the right to treatment generally, see Mason &
Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens, an Evolving Legal and
Scientffc Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124 (1976); Spece, Preserving the Right to Treat-
ment.- A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treat-
ment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1978); Comment, The Right to Treatment andEducational
Rights of Handicapped Persons.- Lora v. Board of Education, 31 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1979);
Comment, Right to Treatmentfor the Civilly Committed- A New Eighth Amendment Basis, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1978).
On the corresponding right to refuse treatment, see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
1979]
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At common law, procedures for involuntary commitment were unneces-
sary since there were virtually no public institutions for the mentally ill.' 9
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the first mental hospital
was established in the United States, care for the mentally disabled rested
with the family and the community.20 Due to a lack of facilities and lim-
ited knowledge about treatment methods, only the violent and the danger-
ous were committed. 21 As more institutions were established, however,
dangerousness to one's self became an additional justification for confine-
22ment,2  This aspect ofparenspatriae was derived from an English practice
by which the king became the guardian of a lunatic's person and prop-
erty. 23 English guardianships, however, were only effective during an indi-
vidual's insane periods while the American innovation could result in total
and possibly permanent loss of liberty.24
(D.N.J. 1978) (involuntary mental patient may have right to refuse medication in absence of
emergency situation). See also Griffith & Griffith, Duty to Third Parties of Dangerousness,
and the Right to Refuse Treatment.- Problematic Conceptsfor Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14
CALIF. L. REV. 461 (1977).
19. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
20. Institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded are the products of nine-
teenth-century reform movements. See Lazerson, Educational Institutions and Mental Sub-
normality.- Notes on Writing a History, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND SOCIETY: A
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 33, 35 (M. Begab & S. Richardson eds. 1975). During the
same period, the American Psychiatric Association was founded in Philadelphia by 13 hos-
pital superintendents. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 7 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds.
1971). The primary nineteenth-century reformers were Dorothea Dix and Ms. E.P.W. Pack-
ard. Ms. Dix, who spent 50 years fighting for better hospital conditions, was instrumental in
founding 32 mental hospitals in the United States and abroad and persuaded 20 states to
establish or enlarge existing mental hospitals. Ms. Packard, who had been committed by her
husband without procedural protections, worked on commitment laws. Her efforts led to the
enactment of a mental health bill requiring a jury trial prior to commitment in Illinois. Id
at 7-8.
The law has fluctuated greatly in its treatment of the mentally disabled. Early procedures
protected the individual's property but did little to prevent physical abuse or reliance on the
charity of friends. Later, the violent and nonviolent mentally disabled were distinguished,
with the former being confined with the itinerant poor. At a later point in history, nonvio-
lent individuals who were burdens on their families became the responsibility of the state
and were confined in public facilities. Id at 8.
21. Id at 5. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 419-20 (1949). See
generally D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
22. See, e.g., In re Josiah Oakes, 8 L. REP. 123, 125 (Mass. 1845) (right to restrain
insane person found in law of humanity requiring confinement of those dangerous to them-
selves). See N. KITTRIE, supra note 7, at 66.
23. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Common law protections for incompetents were eroded due to American
humanitarian motives regarding indigent incompetents. Such individuals roamed about the
countryside in bands, where they were subject to abuses by a society that equated mental
illness with moral turpitude. Since the indigent mentally ill were helpless outside an institu-
[Vol. 29:129
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Historically, children were subject to the parens patriae power of the
state not only in the commitment context but also in other situations where
the state felt it necessary to intervene directly in the management of their
affairs.25 In Wellesley v. Wellesley, 6 for example, an English court denied
a father's petition against his deceased wife's sisters for custody of his mi-
nor child because he was living in adultery and would be a poor moral
example. The court stated that parents had rights over their children by
grace of the state and that control of the child's affairs was given to the
parent as a trust.27 If this trust were not faithfully discharged, the state
could intervene on behalf of the child. Thus, the state's benevolent role as
parens patriae was used as a protective device for children against their
parents as well as a justification for a lack of procedural protections
against deprivations of physical liberty.28 Under the doctrine, state inter-
vention has been justified to protect those persons who cannot protect
themselves, including the protection of children from their parents or other
individuals who seek to harm them, and to compel both children and par-
ents to conduct themselves in ways considered beneficial to society.z9
tional environment, they were confined for their own safety. See A. DEUTSCH, supra note
21, at 4.
25. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, 5
FAM. L.Q. 64, 66 (1971). The state has used parenspatriae to justify a variety of controls
over the child. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (juvenile has no
right to jury trial in adjudicative phase of delinquency proceeding); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (preventing access of minors to pornographic material although such
restriction would be unconstitutional if applied to adults); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (regulating child labor).
26. 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828).
27. Id at 1081. A trust has been defined as a "fiduciary relation with respect to prop-
erty, subjecting persons by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the
property for the benefit of another person which arises as the result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it." Goodenough v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 275 Mich. 698, 703, 267
N.W. 772, 773-74 (1936). In one sense, therefore, children were treated as property in the
care of, but not belonging to, the parent as trustee.
28. A typical example of the lack of procedural protections was found in the juvenile
courts. Prior to the nineteenth century, juvenile offenders were incarcerated with hardened
criminals. In the nineteenth century, however, social and penal reforms were enacted
whereby children were separated from adults and put in their own reformatories. By 1900,
there were 65 reformatories for children in the United States. See Tappan, Approaches to
Children with Problems in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 149, 169 (M.K. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
Children were received into these reformatories from both criminal courts and social agen-
cies. In 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Chicago, and by 1932 all but two
states had juvenile delinquency laws. See N. KiTTRIE, supra note 7, at 108-13. Unfortu-
nately, views on the role of the court in juvenile proceedings and the varied remedies pre-
scribed were inconsistent. Id at 113. Seeln re Winship, 398 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967).
29. See Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 107. The courts and commentators have been criti-
cal of the parenspatriae doctrine. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-60
1979]
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For many years, civil commitment statutes based on parenspatriae did
not require many of the stringent safeguards of criminal proceedings since
the emphasis was on benevolent treatment rather than punishment.3 °
Moreover, the interests of the family were generally believed to be identi-
cal to those of the affected individual, and it was presumed that the rights
of the individual could be waived by his or her family members,31 espe-
cially in the case of children.32 As society became aware, however, that
benevolent proceedings allowing wide discretion could lead to frequent er-
roneous admissions and were often abused by families and authorities, the
courts began to require greater due process protection for adults who faced
involuntary institutionalization.33 In the seminal case of Lessard v.
(1966); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1085-90 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D.
Pa. 1971). See also Note, Due Process and the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil
Commitment, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 615-17 (1974). The Supreme Court has explained
that the meaning of parens patriae "is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966). Nevertheless, the Court has frequently used
the doctrine to justify varied treatment for minors and adults. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1978) (limited access to pornography); McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial in adjudicative phase of juvenile court
proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-39 (1968) (limited access to porno-
graphic material for minors).
30. Many commentators have considered the existence of benevolent treatment or ha-
bilitation in public institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded to be a fallacy
and have described in detail the horrible conditions in many of these facilities. See, e.g., W.
GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVO-
LENCE (1978); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SocIo-
LOGICAL THEORY (1966). Accord, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("physical environment at Pennhurst is hazardous to the
resident, both physically and psychologically"); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (conditions at Willowbrook
cause "deterioration rather than improvement").
31. See Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 106-07.
32. Although some courts have held that parents may not "waive" their children's
rights, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.
Supp. 1039, 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), it
is uncertain what rights children actually have and how broadly they may be exercised in-
dependent of parental authority. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (minor has constitutional right to an abortion without parental consent) with Parham
v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) (parent may admit child to institution upon approval of "neu-
tral factfinder" without substantial procedural protections for the child).
33. Around the turn of the century, a fear of railroading innocent people into institu-
tions resulted in several restrictive commitment statutes. See N. KITrRIE, supra note 22, at
64. These statutes narrowed the group of people who could be committed and provided
procedural protections such as the right to a jury trial. See Ellis, Volunteering Children.-
Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 842-43 (1974).
These statutes came under attack, however, in the 1940's and 1950's when psychiatry be-
came more respected. Id One commentator argued that medical questions rather than
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Schmidt,34 for example, a constitutional challenge was raised against a
civil commitment statute allowing the hospitalization of adults by their
families without formal judicial protections. The district court held the
statute defective because it failed to provide notice, counsel, or the oppor-
tunity to be heard in an adversarial hearing with the right to a jury deci-
sion on the commitment issue.35 The court also required that mental
illness and dangerousness to self or others be found beyond a reasonable
doubt3 6 and that the state pursue the least restrictive placement."
Two years later in Lynch v. Baxley,38 another district court required
many of the same procedural safeguards set forth in Lessard. The proce-
dures applied in Lynch were somewhat more flexible, however, in that the
court permitted a waiver of the individual's right to be present upon court
approval.39 In addition, a guardian ad/item could be substituted for coun-
sel if he or she was a licensed attorney with a truly adversarial role.' Fi-
nally, the court established a clear and convincing evidence standard
".civil rights" were involved in the commitment decision and procedural protections should
be lessened. Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in Commitment of the
Mentally 111, 56 YALE L.J. 1178, 1189-90 (1947). The result was a shift of commitment
power from judges to psychiatrists. Ellis, supra note 33, at 843. With a later trend toward
voluntary commitment, see Developments in the Law.- Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193 n.4 (1974), the percentage of individuals subject to involuntary
commitment decreased, and procedures justifying confinement came under stricter judicial
scrutiny. See Ellis, supra note 33, at 843-44.
34. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
35. Id at 1092. The right to a jury trial in commitment proceedings has been criticized
as inducing trauma in the patient and humiliation in his or her family. See Ellis, supra note
33, at 884-85.
36. Id at 1095. The Court has recently decided that the appropriate standard of proof
for involuntary commitment proceedings is clear and convincing evidence rather than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1810-13 (1979).
37. 349 F. Supp. at 1095-96. For a discussion of the right to the least restrictive alterna-
tive, see D. Chambers, The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative." The Constitutional
Issues, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 486-99 (M. Kindred ed.
1971). See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (mentally retarded have constitutional right to habilitation in the least re-
strictive setting); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (constitutional
right to placement in least restrictive setting consonant with legitimate safety, care, and
treatment objectives); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D.D.C. 1972) (depriva-
tion of liberty of dangerous patient not beyond what is necessary for protection); Dixon v.
Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (maximum security institution is
adverse to rehabilitation).
38. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
39. Under the procedures applied in Lynch, either the child or his attorney could waive
the child's presence at the hearing. Id at 388-89.
40. Id at 389. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed to prosecute or defend a
suit on behalf of an infant or a party otherwise incapacitated. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57
(5th ed. 1979).
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rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt as sufficient for civil commit-
ment.4 t
Prior to these and other challenges to involuntary commitment statutes,
the courts had begun to recognize that many substantive and procedural
rights were applicable to minors. For example, in both In re Gault42 and
In re Winshp,43 the Supreme Court held that juveniles threatened with
confinement in juvenile penal institutions were entitled to many of the due
process protections allowed adults in criminal proceedings, including a
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' Despite these encouraging
developments, however, the scope of juvenile rights has remained limited.
Although the Court has found that minors are "persons" under the Consti-
tution "possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,, 45 it
has extended to children only limited first amendment,46 due process,4 7
and equal protection rights,48 primarily in the areas of education and juve-
nile court proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has used parenspatriae to
support a broader authority over children than adults, with rights afforded
minors often differing in substance and implementation from those
granted adults. 49 Some of the rationales for this differentiation include a
child's vulnerability and lack of judgment, maintenance of family author-
41. 386 F. Supp. at 393. The reason given by the court for the clear and convincing
standard of proof was that the subjective determinations required in civil commitments
"cannot ordinarily be made with the same degree of certainty that might be achieved where
purely objective facts and occurrences are at issue." Id Accord, Addington v. Texas, 99 S.
Ct. 1804, 1812-13 (1979).
42. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. Id. See Smith, An Analysis of When Juveniles Must Be Afforded Due Process Rights,
58 NEB. L. REV. 136 (1978). See note 4 supra.
45. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
46. Id. (child's free speech rights violated by school prohibition of political armbands);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (child's required participation in
school Bible reading violates establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(required daily prayers in public school violates establishment clause); West Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (required flag salute violates child's free speech).
47. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile proceedings merit due process
protections including proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(minor facing confinement in juvenile facility entitled to due process protections).
48. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children entitled to maintain
action for wrongful death of their mother); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(educational segregation of children based on race violates equal protection clause).
49. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial in
juvenile court adjudicative proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state
may prohibit sale of sexual material to children although such material remains available to
adults). As one court has suggested, however, either "all fundamental rights apply to mi-
nors, but the state may sometimes assert an interest sufficient to justify the state action" or
"minors do not necessarily have all of the fundamental rights of adults." Poe v. Gerstein,
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ity, and some form of independent parental interest.5°
Children's rights cases have generally pitted the child against the state
with the parent's interest assumed to be identical to that of the child.5 In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 2 however, the Court was presented with
a conflict between the interests of parent and child, where the state was
placed in the position of either supporting parental authority or safeguard-
ing a fundamental right of the minor. The case concerned a state statute
which denied a pregnant minor the right to an abortion without parental
consent. The Court recognized a clear conflict of private interests and
found the family structure sufficiently fractured to find no substantial state
interest in sanctioning parental authority at the expense of the clear pri-
vacy right of the minor to obtain an abortion.53 Thus, the Court upheld
the minor's right to make her own abortion decision.
A similar conflict between the independent interests of parent and child
exists in the context of "voluntary" commitment of minors to institutions
upon parental request.54 For mentally retarded children, these conflicting
interests were raised first in Heryford v. Parker55 and Saville v. Tread-
way.56 In Parker, the Tenth Circuit found that the deprivation of liberty
inherent in the commitment of a nine-year-old child to a training school
had enough constitutional significance to require the procedural protection
of counsel prior to commitment.57 Similiarly, in Saville, a federal district
517 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has expressed no firm position on this
issue.
50. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children.- Due Process Rights and
Their Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 160-63 (1978). This independent parental interest in
the child's development was termed a "right" in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925). See note 3 supra. It has been suggested that if parents are to have an absolute
right over their children in situations where their interests conflict, a theoretical possibility
would be "removal of the child from government by rule of law," and a true status relation-
ship would be created whereby the child would be subject to rules enforced by his or her
parents. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra, at 167.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
53. The Court acknowledged the state's broader authority in regulating children's activ-
ities but conditioned this authority on a "significant" state interest rather than the "compel-
ling" state interest used in the context of adult abortion decisions. Id at 75.
54. See Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutional-
ized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
55. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
56. 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
57. Finding a liberty interest for mentally retarded children in such proceedings, the
court stated:
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether
the subject matter be mental instability orjuvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood
of involuntary incarceration - whether for punishment as an adult for a crime,
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court found that procedures which allowed mentally retarded children to
be admitted to a state hospital and school by their parents without restric-
tion were constitutionally insufficient when the children could be released
only through the consent of state authorities or through court proceed-
ings. 8 Both Parker and Saville, therefore, focused more on safeguarding
the child's liberty interest rather than deferring to parental decisionmak-
ing.
Challenges to state procedures for the "voluntary" commitment of both
"mentally ill" and "mentally retarded" minors became most visible in Bar-
tley v. Kremens59 and JL. v. Parham.60 Bartley was a class action brought
on behalf of all children under nineteen who were subject to a Penn-
sylvania statute authorizing commitment to institutions for the mentally ill
and the mentally retarded by parental request.6 ' After application by the
parent, the statute authorized the director of the facility to have an exami-
nation made of the child, upon which the commitment decision would be
based.62 The district court found the procedures inadequate and man-
dated that the child be given the opportunity for judicial process prior to
commitment. 6 ' The court made no distinction between preadmission and
postadmission procedures. It allowed the child to be admitted by the par-
ent but required a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours by an
unbiased tribunal to determine whether institutionalization was neces-
sary." If the probable cause hearing indicated the need for institutional-
ization, then judicial procedures, including notice and a hearing, were to
rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency or treatment as a feeble-minded or
mental incompetent - which commands observance of the constitutional safe-
guards of due process.
396 F.2d at 396.
58. The court reasoned that the potential for such a severe deprivation of the mentally
retarded child's liberty and the possible conflict of interest between parent and child made
procedural protections necessary. 404 F. Supp. at 432. As one commentator has explained:
[TJhe parent may be motivated to ask for such institutionalization for a variety of
reasons other than the best interests of the child himself, i.e., the interests of other
children in the family, mental and physical frustrations, economic stress, hostility
toward the child stemming from the added pressures of caring for him, and per-
ceived stigma of mental retardation. The retarded child's best interests may lie in
being with his family and in the community but theirs may not lie in keeping him.
Amicus Curiae Brief, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), quoted in Mur-
dock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded- Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
133, 139 (1972).
59. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated as moot, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
60. 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
61. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2) (Purdon 1969).
62. Id §§ 402(b), 403(b).
63. 402 F. Supp. at 1049-54.
64. Id at 1049.
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be made available to the child.6" The procedures prescribed by the court
were extremely flexible, however, since the child or his or her attorney
could waive all of these rights except for notice of commitment and assist-
ance of counsel.66
After the Supreme Court granted probable jurisdiction to hear the
case, 7 Pennsylvania enacted a statute giving added procedural protection
to "mentally ill" children fourteen years old and older but left largely un-
changed the position of the "mentally retarded" minor." As a result, the
Supreme Court refused to decide the case on its merits, finding the claims
of the same class members mooted by the legislation.69 Although some of
the class members had live claims, the Court remanded the case to the
district court with clear instructions to narrow the certified class.7' The
Court thereby avoided deciding what procedural protections were neces-
sary to commit mentally ill or mentally retarded children and youths. On
remand, however, the district court merely redefined the class to exclude
all mentally ill minors over fourteen subject to commitment; that is, those
who had been recently afforded substantial procedural protections under
the Act.71
The Supreme Court again granted probable jurisdiction to hear the
case, 72 this time in tandem with Parham v. JL, a class action contesting
the liberty rights of "mentally ill" children subject to Georgia's voluntary
admission statute.73 Under the statute, parents could commit their chil-
dren under eighteen to mental health facilities if the child showed evidence
of mental illness and was found to be suitable for treatment. In addition,
the child's release could be conditioned on parental consent.74 Moreover,
65. Id at 1049-54.
66. Id at 1053-54, 1054 n.26. See note 152 infra.
67. 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The 1976 Penn-
sylvania Act was a significant reform in commitment procedures granting "mentally ill"
minors, at least, some of the most progressive procedural protections in the country. See
Comment, Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 669 (1977); Com-
ment, Pennsylvania's Commitment: The Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 1035
(1977).
69. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128-29 (1977).
70. In remanding, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to "stop, look, and
listen" before certifying a class and to pay careful attention "to the differences between
mentally ill and mentally retarded [children] and between the young and the very young."
Id at 135-36.
71. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 42-43
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
72. 431 U.S. 936 (1977).
73. GA. CODE §§ 88-503.1, .2 (1953).
74. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 139 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
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the statute made no distinctions between procedure for admission and con-
tinuing commitment, and particular procedures were devised without uni-
formity among the various Georgia hospitals.75 The district court found
the Georgia statute unconstitutional because it provided "absolutely no
due process" protection for the child.76 In addition, the district court en-
joined future commitments under the procedures and ordered the state ei-
ther to remove those children already incarcerated or to recommit them
utilizing other Georgia laws providing more substantial procedural protec-
tions.77
II. PARHAM'S MINIMAL PREADMISSION DUE PROCESS
In 1979, the Supreme Court disposed of both the Pennsylvania and
Georgia cases by determining what protections are constitutionally re-
quired prior to "voluntary" admissions of minors to state institutions by
their parents. In Parham v. JR. 78 and Secretary of Public Welfare v. Insti-
tutionalized Juveniles,7 9 the Court found that some form of inquiry by a
"neutral factfinder" with the power to refuse admission must be made to
determine whether preadmission due process requirements have been sat-
isfied.8" The factfinder, who need not be an attorney or other judicial of-
ficer, must probe the child's background employing all available sources,
including an interview with the child prior to admission.8 In addition, the
Court ruled in both cases that the child's need for continuing commitment
must be periodically reviewed by an independent procedure to be defined
by the state.8 2 Since the Court found that both Pennsylvania's and Geor-
gia's procedures comported with these minimal due process requirements,
75. GA. CODE § 88-503.3(a) (1953).
76. For a discussion of the various procedures used, see Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493,
2497-500 (1979).
77. 412 F. Supp. at 140. The court also ordered Georgia to expend whatever amount of
money necessary to provide resources and personnel for more appropriate nonhospital facil-
ities. Id at 139-40.
78. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979). The Supreme Court decision was captioned under the name
of a different member of the plaintiff-class due to the death of the named appellee before the
district court, J.L., pending review by the Supreme Court.
79. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
80. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2506.
81. Id at 2506. The "neutal factfinder" had to have the authority to refuse any child
for admission not satisfying the state's "medical standards." The standards, however, are
specified in the statute only as showing "evidence of mental illness" and being "suitable for
treatment." GA. CODE § 88-503.1 (1953).
82. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2506; Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. at 2526. In Parham, the Supreme Court left the district court free to
decide whether the differing review procedures found in the various Georgia hospitals were
sufficient in themselves to justify continuing voluntary commitments. 99 S. Ct. at 2511.
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it reversed the lower courts' findings that judicial protections were consti-
tutionally required prior to admission. 3 On the issue of postadmission
procedures, the Court remanded the cases to determine whether the states'
procedures were sufficient to justify continuing "voluntary" commitments
of children to state institutions.8 4
By distinguishing between preadmission and postadmission procedures,
however, the Parham Court avoided the most compelling issue before it;
namely, what procedures were necessary to justify a child's confinement
for an extended period of time. Although Georgia's statute was ostensibly
a voluntary admission statute, it permitted confinement for an indetermi-
nate period, conceivably until the child attained his or her majority.85 The
plaintiffs' attack on the statute was leveled not only at its admission as-
pects, but also at its continuing commitment power.
In Institutionalized Juveniles, the Court's cursory treatment of the issues
not only misconstrued the findings of the lower court86 but also failed to
reach the issue of whether different procedural protections should be
granted the various groups within the class.87 As previously stated, the
district court in this case had denied preadmission hearings and allowed
the initial hospitalization of children in state institutions on parental re-
quest.8 8 The court foreshadowed the Supreme Court's reasoning by ex-
plaining that the prospect of an adversarial hearing prior to admission
might deter parents from seeking assistance for their child.8 9 The district
court required, however, that within seventy-two hours a probable cause
hearing be held on the need for confinement and further required a full
hearing on the commitment decision within two weeks.9" Procedures for
83. Id; Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. at 2528.
84. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2511; Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. at 2523.
85. The statute provides in relevant part: "[Sluch person may be detained by such facil-
ity for such period and under such conditions as may be authorized by law." GA. CODE §
88-503.1 (1953). "The superintendent of the facility shall discharge any voluntary patient
who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved that the superin-
tendent determines that hospitalization of the patient is no longer desirable." Id § 88-503.2
(1953).
86. Although the lower court had formulated clear postadmission procedures, see note
63 supra, the Supreme Court characterized these procedures as only being required prior to
admission. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. at 2526.
87. The various subgroups included were mentally ill children 14 and over, mentally ill
children under 14, mentally retarded children 13 and older, and mentally retarded children
under 13. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977).
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continued commitment, rather than preadmission protections, therefore,
were the primary issues before the Supreme Court.
The Court's artificial distinction between admission and continued com-
mitment in both Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles narrowed its focus
to less controversial preadmission procedures. In so doing, it largely ig-
nored the prior law, including the lower court decisions in Institutionalized
Juveniles, which mandated procedures for continued hospitalization. 9
Accordingly, the Court's discussion of the issues in Institutionalized
Juveniles was minimal and its analysis was almost exclusively articulated
in Parham. Within the narrowly defined context of preadmission proce-
dures, the Parham Court attempted a due process analysis of the appropri-
ateness of judicial involvement in admissions by parental request.
In determining the private interest involved, the Court acknowledged
the child's substantial liberty interest in not being erroneously confined
and the possibility of "adverse social consequences" but not necessarily
stigma, stemming from institutionalization. 2 The Court also found, how-
ever, that the private interest involved a "combination of the child's and
parents' concerns"; the child's interest being "inextricably linked with the
parents' interest in, and obligation for, the health and welfare of the
child."93 By deferring to traditional parental authority over children, the
Court found that parents "retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in
the [admission] decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse" and ac-
cepted the presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their
child by seeking the child's hospitalization.94
91. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
92. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503. The Court used the due process test articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), for its determination of what protections
were required prior to admission. The three factors to be considered in such a due process
analysis are: the private interest to be affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through procedures used along with the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards; and the government's interests, including financial and administrative
burdens additional or substitute procedures would entail. Id See Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977). If the potential for
an erroneous deprivation is found to warrant a hearing under the test, the hearing may be
conducted before or after the liberty invasion. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (hearing required prior to termination of welfare benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge,
431 U.S. 319 (1976) (for social security disability benefits, a hearing after termination is
sufficient). This proceeding may be either administrative or judicial. Compare Mathews v.
Eldridge, 431 U.S. 319 (1976) (administrative hearing regarding disability benefits) with In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (prior to a deprivation of liberty, a juvenile delinquent must
receive a judicial hearing).
93. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
94. Id at 2505.
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The Court distinguished Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,95 by finding
that the existence of an independent factfinder made parental power in the
commitment context less than absolute. This view assumes, of course, that
the "neutral factfinder", namely the admitting clinician, can be truly neu-
tral and capable of making an accurate diagnosis under stressful circum-
stances.96 Even though the Court admitted the "fallibility of medical and
psychiatric diagnosis," 97 it viewed the commitment decision as medical in
nature and more suitably made by a clinically trained physician rather
than an untrained judge. Citing evidence that adversarial involuntary
commitment hearings for adults were often a sham, 98 the Court assumed
the sufficiency of existing psychiatric practices instead of focusing on alter-
native safeguards for individual rights. Moreover, recent literature indi-
cates that commitment hearings can produce judgments independent of
those made by psychiatrists and are therefore valid. 99
In terms of the state's interests in "voluntary" commitment proceedings
95. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
96. Both assumptions were addressed in the amicus briefs filed with the Court in these
cases. See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Center for Law and the Handicapped at 52-55,
Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979); Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of Child Welfare League of America at 63-64, Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493
(1979). These assumptions have also been criticized in commentary. See T. SZAZ, THE
MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 35 (1970) (tendencies toward overcommitment have been
noted as more pronounced for patients who are children). See also LEE & TEMERLIN, Social
Class, Diagnoses and Prognosesfor Psychotherapy, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE 181 (1970); T. SCHEFF, supra note 30; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the
Presumption of Expertise Flping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973),reprinted in 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 379 (1973).
97. 99 S. Ct. at 2507. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), Chief Justice
Burger stated that "there can be little responsible debate regarding the uncertainty of diag-
nosis in this field [psychiatry] and the tentativeness of professional judgment." Id at 584
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
Recently, Chief Justice Burger reiterated this concern when he stated that "[tihe subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situa-
tions . . . . Psychiatric diagnosis is ... to a large extent based on medical impressions
drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician."
Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1811 (1979).
98. 99 S. Ct. at 2508.
99. Compare Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures.- An Empirical Study in the
Courtroom, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651, 664-65 (1970) (although judges agreed with psychia-
trists on release, they were less willing to do so for commitment) and Zander, Civil Commit-
ment in Wisconsin.- The Impact of Lessard, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 503, 552 (when strict judicial
proceedings are followed, hearings are longer with greater emphasis on dangerousness and
less restrictive alternatives) with Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect ofLegal Counsel on Admis-
sions to a State Mental Hospital". A Confrontation ofProfessions, 10 J. HEALTH & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 66 (1968) (judges unquestionably rely on medical recommendations, but a corre-
lation exists between representation by counsel and decision not to commit).
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for minors, the Court noted the importance of removing unnecessary ob-
stacles to treatment and allocating scarce resources to those most in
need. ' The Court also recognized the state's reluctance to interfere in
family disputes. While this policy has a generally sound social basis, par-
ticularly within the privacy of the home,' 0 ' state action considerations are
raised when the state intervenes to assist families in asserting parental au-
thority over children by making available institutional treatment facilities
when parents request them.
The state has an obvious responsibility to protect sufficiently the individ-
ual child's liberty interest when he or she is institutionalized by parental
request. 10 2 The Parham Court, however, was not convinced that protec-
tions of judicial process were required to prevent erroneous deprivations of
a child's liberty. Giving extreme deference to family autonomy, the Court
dismissed the need for a formal adversarial hearing, finding insufficient
evidence of a conflict of interest between parent and child. 0 3 Moreover,
the Court explained that formal hearings risk exacerbation of family ten-
sions.°4 Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the assumption that loving,
concerned parents would support the treatment process and welcome the
child back into the home as soon as possible while divergence from this
pattern would be "a rare exception" to the rule.'0 5
100. 99 S. Ct. at 2505-06.
101. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 50, at 183.
102. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 928, 569 P.2d 1286, 14 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). In
this case a 14-year-old minor sought by writ of habeas corpus his release from a mental
hospital to which he had been committed by his mother. The Supreme Court of California
held that the parent could not waive the child's right to a determination of whether he was
mentally ill, dangerous to himself, or likely to benefit from institutionalization. The court
justified this limitation on parental authority by finding that an erroneous commitment
would jeopardize the health and safety of the child and would create significant social bur-
dens. 19 Cal. 3d at 929, 569 P.2d at 1290-91, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
When a parent removes a child from the family and places him in an institution, the
sanctity of family autonomy has been breached by the parents themselves. There is a clear
distinction between a parent's decision to seek medical treatment for his or her child and a
parent's decision to commit his or her child to a state institution. The former is a temporary
removal of the child from the home while the latter is by definition custodial confinement
which may be of indefinite duration. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 27-28 (1967); Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Child Welfare League of America, supra note 96, at 67. Even in the area
of medical decisionmaking, however, the state has circumscribed parental authority when
the consequences may be of grave concern to the child and not in his or her best interest.
See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cer. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (blood
transfusion for child authorized despite first amendment objections of parents on religious
grounds).
103. 99 S. Ct. at 2505, 2508. But see note 105 infra.
104. Id
105. This assumption, while consistent with the Court's finding that there is no conflict of
interest between parent and child in the "voluntary" commitment context, ignores the find-
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This assumption of a loving parent-child relationship, however, did not
apply to those children who were wards of the state in Parham, and the
Court had to decide whether these juveniles should receive the same mini-
mal preadmission procedural protections afforded children committed by
their parents. Ignoring the increased state involvement, the Court found
no need to treat wards differently from other minors if a state's application
for admission was reasonable and made in good faith.'06 The majority did
suggest, however, that postadmission procedures for wards of the state
should be more extensive than those for children committed by their par-
ents, because the "absence of an adult who cares deeply for a child...
may have some effect on how long a child will remain in the hospital."'
' 0 7
Although Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Stevens
joined, agreed with the majority that "voluntary" admission of minors
upon parental request required minimal due process protections,10 8 they
argued that juveniles who were wards of the state were entitled to formal
hearings before confinement in mental institutions.0 9 In their view, there
was no justification for denying these children due process hearings simply
because they were committed by their social workers." 0 They explained
that commitment in such a context does not give rise to the traditional
deference to family authority and the special considerations articulated by
the Court to justify postponement of formal proceedings when parents ini-
tiate commitment."' From a constitutional standpoint, the dissenters ar-
gued that a ward's liberty interest required at least as much due process
protection, if not more, as adults in the involuntary commitment context.
They emphasized the high risk of an erroneous commitment without for-
mal procedures because of the uncertainty of diagnosis," 2 the abnormal
ings of fact made by the lower courts. See, e.g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of
Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 36-38 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp.
1039, 1044, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In his concurrence in Parham, Justice Stewart ex-
panded this finding of no conflict of interest between parent and child by explaining that
there is no constitutional difference between a parent's decision to have an appendectomy
performed on his child and a decision to have his child committed. 99 S. Ct. at 2515 (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
106. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2512.
107. Id
108. Id at 2515-16 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 2516.
110. Id at 2522.
111. Justice Brennan asserted that social workers would not be deterred from initiating
commitment proceedings if preadmission hearings were required since children as wards
would be receiving assistance while proceedings were pending, and hearings would probably
neither traumatize these children nor otherwise hamper their recovery. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. See notes 96, 97 and accompanying text supra.
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degree of stress often exhibited by a child in the commitment situation," 13
and a tendency of psychiatrists to overcommit by erring on the side of
caution.' 
1 4
Addressing the issue of parents seeking the commitment of their chil-
dren who are not wards of the state, the dissenters emphasized that these
children are not accurately described as voluntary patients." 5 In their
opinion, Danforth"1 6 was controlling, but only in the postadmissions con-
text. Analogizing to the privacy interest involved when a minor seeks an
abortion without parental consent, the dissenters stated that the right to
freedom from wrongful confinement, stigma, and intrusions upon one's
bodily integrity is at least as great as the right to obtain an abortion."' In
Danforth, however, the Court had recognized a potential conflict of inter-
est surrounding an abortion decision and assumed a fractured family
structure, whereas in Parham and in Institutionalized Juveniles, the Court
refused to make these assumptions at the admission stage. By limiting its
inquiry to preadmission procedural protections, the majority chose to en-
courage parents to seek treatment for their child and ignored lower court
findings and other evidence in the record on fractured family structures
and inaccurate diagnoses. The dissenters, on the other hand, were only
willing to postpone formal protections. At the postadmission level, they
found a conflict of interest analogous to Danforth's requiring a full range
of due process.' 18
Though the dissenters argued that the Court should have determined
appropriate postadmission procedures including a hearing and counsel,
they too failed to realize that in Institutionalized Juveniles and arguably in
Parham the lower courts had already undertaken this task. Nevertheless,
since the Court left unanswered the procedures necessary to maintain a
mentally ill or a mentally retarded child in a state institution, an analysis
of the similarities and differences between the mentally ill and the men-
tally retarded, their various needs, and the factors to be considered in ap-
plying postadmission due process for both groups is appropriate.
113. See J. SIMONS, PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF CHILDREN 1, 6 (1974); Laurie &
Rieger, Psychiatric And Psychological Examination of Children, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK
ON PSYCHIATRY 19 (S. Arieti ed. 1974).
114. See note 96 supra.
115. 99 S. Ct. at 2518 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).




III. POSTADMISSION PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR BOTH
MENTALLY ILL AND MENTALLY RETARDED MINORS
Since the Court has required only minimal procedural protections in the
preadmissions context, it is important to ascertain whether such prelimi-
nary procedures are sufficient to justify continuing commitments for both
mentally ill and mentally retarded children. A due process analysis of
postadmission procedures, therefore, must examine the potential problems
surrounding the initial admission decision as well as the effects of contin-
ued institutionalization.
When both the mentally ill child" 9 and the mentally retarded child 2 °
are voluntarily committed to state institutions by their parents, the sur-
rounding circumstances have often evidenced clear conflicts between the
interests of parent and child. The children alleged to be mentally ill in
Institutionalized Juveniles, for example, were all from disrupted, chaotic
homes. ' 2' The expert witnesses for all parties involved in that case agreed
that families in which a minor had been committed were generally charac-
terized by severe stress, disharmony, and dislocation and that often the
juvenile's behavior leading to hospitalization may in fact have been pro-
voked by parents.122 The testimony also recognized that parents often seek
to institutionalize their children for the wrong reasons and cannot be "ob-
119. Mental illness is a vague concept with its definition generally based on the norms of
the definer. As stated in one comment: "[B]ecause of the unavoidably ambiguous generali-
ties in which the American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the
diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person
he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On Other
Justocationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968). See also Duehn &
Mayados, The Effect of Practice Orientations on Clinical Assessment, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSY-
CHIATRY 629 (1976) (extent of negative mental health labeling determined in part by factors
extraneous to patient's behavior).
120. To constitute mental retardation, the intellectual impairment must exist "concur-
rently with deficits in adaptive behavior and [be] manifested during the developmental pe-
riod." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY
AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (H. Grossman ed. 1973). The mentally
retarded are generally placed into four categories by psychologists: the educable, who com-
prise 89% of those labeled mentally retarded, can attain relative self-sufficiency; the moder-
ately retarded, who comprise 6% of the retarded population, can attend to their personal
needs, and can assist in the home as well as in sheltered workshops; the severely retarded,
who comprise about 3.5% of the retarded population, can learn self-care skills but produce
little economically; and finally, the profoundly retarded who require residential care at some
period in their lives outside the home, but are generally able to acquire some basic self-care
techniques. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS - FACTS ON MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 5 (1973).
121. See Brief for Appellees at 55-56, Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2532 (1979).
122. Id at 52-53.
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jective reporters" of their child's behavioral background. 123
Similarly, parents who seek to institutionalize their "mentally retarded"
children cannot be presumed to be neutral and detached observers of their
child's behavior. Having a retarded child leads to stress on a family's emo-
tional and financial resources, threatens its sociopsychological balance,
and generally disrupts family life. 124 Since mental retardation is a combi-
nation of intellectual impairment and behavioral maladaptation, the pro-
fessional's diagnosis of retardation must be based on reports of the child's
behavior from lay parent observers who are intimately affected by the de-
cision. 125 Though many state procedures, such as those relied on in Institu-
tionalized Juveniles, may require diagnosis of the child prior to initiation
of commitment proceedings by a parent,126 it has been noted that family-
oriented physicians tend to base a recommendation for commitment on
what they feel is best for the entire family rather than what is the least
restrictive alternative for the child.
127
Moreover, parents who seek the commitment of their mentally ill and
mentally retarded children and physicians who recommend such institu-
tionalization may not be aware of less drastic alternatives; in fact, none
may exist in their community. 128 A negative societal attitude toward the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill has often resulted in prohibitive
zoning ordinances and covenants designed to keep mainstreaming projects
123. Id at 54. For a discussion of the tendency of parents to use their disturbed child as
a scapegoat for family problems, see Bell & Vogel, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the
Family Scapegoat, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 412 (1968); LAING &
ESTERSON, INSANITY, MADNESS, AND THE FAMILY (1964).
124. See Begab, The Mentally Retarded and the Family, in PREVENTION & TREATMENT
OF MENTAL RETARDATION 71 (1. Phillips ed. 1966); Davis, Family Processes in Mental Retar-
dation, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340 (1967); Mickenberg, he Silent Clients.- Legal and Ethi-
cal Considerations in Representing Severey and Profoundly Retarded Indiiduals, 31 STAN. L
REV. 625 (1979).
125. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 50, at 153, 188. Since mental retardation is
characterized by intellectual and behavioral maladaptation, reliance on the latter element
may provide inaccuracies in diagnosis. Id at 189.
126. See 3 PA. BULL. 1840 (1973).
127. See Kelly & Menolascino, Physicians'Awareness andAttitudes Toward the Retarded,
13 MENTAL RETARDATION 10 (1975). See also PARENTS SPEAK OUT: VIEWS FROM THE
OTHER SIDE OF THE TwO-WAY MIRROR (Turnbull & Turnbull eds. 1978) (mental retarda-
tion professionals describe their experiences as parents of mentally retarded children). Di-
agnostic tests themselves, if given below the age of two, also have their own problems in
terms of reliability over short periods of time. See L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHO-
LOGICAL TESTING 210 (1960); Menolascino, Emotional Disturbance and Mental Retardation,
70 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 248, 250 (1965).
128. The availability of alternatives is often a function of socioeconomic status. The
poor not only have limited access to many private facilities, they also receive less assistance
in making the difficult commitment decision. See Ellis, supra note 33, at 852.
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out of local communities.'29 Accordingly, parents who cannot afford to
send their children to private residential schools are often forced to send
their children to restrictive state institutions which have been described as
"storing" people rather than vigorously pursuing the goal of normaliza-
tion. 1
30
Once the child is removed from the home, the need to defer to parental
interests is significantly diminished, and the state assumes the responsibil-
ity of assuring that continued institutionalization is necessary for the
child.131 Regardless of the appropriateness of the initial commitment and
placement, once institutionalized, the child's liberty interest should be-
come primary. This liberty interest extends beyond mere freedom from
physical confinement and includes protection from the adverse effects of
confinement on the overall growth, development, and well being of the
child. While institutionalized, juveniles are forced to live away from their
families, friends, and community in unfamiliar surroundings in which they
may be subjected to intrusive treatments that can violate their bodily integ-
rity.'32 In addition, once a mentally ill or mentally retarded individual is
institutionalized, the lack of opportunities to seek legal assistance and the
complacency often accompanying incarceration may functionally diminish
whatever motivation the child may have to seek judicial assistance. 133
Moreover, while both adults and children suffer the stigma and humilia-
tion resulting from institutionalization, children generally experience more
severe effects since they tend to be confined for longer periods of time and
are more impressionable and vulnerable.' 34 Indeed, mentally retarded
children who are often viewed as incapable of "getting better" may remain
in institutions for their entire lives, getting worse. 135 Given the profound
129. See Schoenfeld, .4 Survey of the Constitutional Rights ofthe Mentally Retarded, 32
Sw. U.L.J. 605, 629-32 (1978).
130. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313 (5th Cir. 1974) (Alabama's Partlow
State School and Hospital's treatment of its inmates is more accurately described as "storage
of persons" rather than care or even custody); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (treatment and care do not exist in many
state institutions).
131. See note 102 supra.
132. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2516 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See note 18 supra.
133. Strauss, Reaction Comment to Due Process in Civil Commitment and Elsewhere in
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 483 (M. Kindred ed. 1976).
134. See J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 80 (1963); B. FLINT, THE
CHILD AND THE INSTITUTION 14-15 (1966); N. HOBBS, THE FUTURES OF CHILDREN 142-43
(1975); J. HOROCHs, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 156 (1970).
135. See Begab, The Mentally Retarded and Society. Trends and Issues in THE MEN-
TALLY RETARDED AND SOCIETY: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 3 (M. Begab & S. Rich-
ardson eds. 1975). As a result of institutionalization, studies have shown decreases in
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effect institutionalization has on a person's life, additional safeguards must
be introduced to prevent continued erroneous commitment.
Another obvious factor to be addressed in determining appropriate post-
admission procedures is the risk of erroneous commitment under existing
procedures and the extent this risk could be reduced by additional or alter-
native procedural safeguards.' 36 Questions to be considered include
whether the decisionmaker has reliable and direct knowledge of the facts
bringing about the deprivation and how other procedures might impact on
the risk of error. 137 At the present time, as in Georgia, the only required
postadmission procedural protection for "mentally ill" minors is the unde-
fined independent review required by the Supreme Court in Parham. This
review should be held promptly after admission, because despite the
Court's findings, there is a substantial risk of error in relying upon a "neu-
tral factfinder's" preadmission interviews with distraught parents and an
upset child as a basis for hospitalization. 138 Even assuming no conflict of
interest between parent and child, such an emotionally charged situation
cannot lead to a great deal of diagnostic accuracy; hence, the medical ten-
dency to err on the side of caution and admit the child will often pre-
intelligence quotients. See Siegel & Sternlich, Institutional Residence and Intellectual Func-
tioning, 12 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH 119 (1968); Silverstein, Changes in the Mea-
sured Intelligence of Institutionalized Retardates as a Function of Hospital Age, I
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 125 (1969). But see Zigler, Butterfield & Capobianco, Institution-
alization and the Effectiveness of Social Reinforcement.- A Five and Eight Year Follow- Up
Study, 3 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 255 (1970). Institutionalization has also resulted in de-
creased motor skills. See Centerwall & Centerwall, A Study of Children with Mongolism
Reared in the Home Compared to those Reared A way from the Home, 25 PEDIATRICS 678
(1960); Francis, The Effects of Own-Home and Institution-Rearing on the Behavioral Develop-
ment of Normal andMongol Children, 12 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCH. 173 (1971). Institution-
alization may also adversely affect the development of social skills. See Guthrie, Butler &
Gorlow, Personality D!ferences Between Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Retar-
dates, 67 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 543 (1963) (negative self-attitude); Hobbs, A Compar-
ison of Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Mentally Retarded, 69 AM. J. MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 206, 210 (1964) (socially inadequate children are more likely to be subjected to
institutionalization which increases their social incompetence). For a discussion of the im-
pact of institutionalization on verbal skills, see Schlanger, Environmental Influences on the
Verbal Output of Mentally Retarded Children, 19 J. SPEECH & HEARING DISORDERS 339
(1954). But see Montague, Hutchinson & Matson, .4 Comparative Computer Content Analysis
of the Verbal Behavior of Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Retarded Children, 18 J.
SPEECH & HEARING RESEARCH 43 (1975).
136. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
137. An added benefit from formal procedures such as a hearing would probably be
assistance to parents in obtaining less restrictive alternatives to institutionalization for their
child. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 50, at 199. The choices for a parent should not be
limited to either institutionalization or a return of the child to the home. See generally R.
SCHEERENBERGER, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1972).
138. See notes 96-97 supra.
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vail.'3 9 At the bare minimum, postadmission reviews must produce
greater accuracy, and a full adversarial hearing would contribute substan-
tially toward attaining this goal.
At the postadmission stage, the Parham Court's reasons for precluding
adversarial inquiries disappear. First, unlike preadmission judicial pro-
cess, postadmission procedures would not substantially deter parents from
hospitalizing their child. Second, the child's treatment would not be
delayed since he or she would already be in the state's custody before a
review of the appropriateness of restrictive hospitalization. Third, since
the family's autonomy would already have been fractured, a postadmis-
sion diagnosis would be based predominantly on observations of staff
rather than parents. Moreover, the adversaries in such a hearing would be
the physician urging commitment and the child's advocate, rather than the
parent and child. Thus, the negative effects of any trauma to parent and
child as a result of a postadmission hearing would be outweighed substan-
tially by the involvement of a state institution in the child's daily life. A
long-term erroneous commitment would certainly be a far greater trauma
for the child.
The precise nature of postadmission protections for the mentally ill or
mentally retarded child is complicated by the various classifications of
juveniles recognized by the states and judiciary. Some commentators
would argue that postadmission procedural protections for "mentally re-
tarded" children should differ from those afforded "mentally ill" children
and that young children require less procedural protection than older chil-
dren.'4 ° Such disparate treatment is based on societal notions of compe-
tence to make one's own decisions and the protective parenspatriae model.
Pennsylvania's postadmission procedures, for example, reflect these no-
tions. Under Pennsylvania procedures, mentally ill children over fourteen
are treated like adults facing involuntary commitment. Mentally retarded
children thirteen years of age and younger, on the other hand, receive
neither representation nor a reasonably prompt postadmission hearing.
Either the child or someone acting on his or her behalf must bring a writ of
habeas corpus to contest an erroneous commitment.' 4 ' Between these two
extremes are mentally retarded children fourteen and older and children
confined as mentally ill under fourteen who must have their rights ex-
plained to them and be informed that periodic status reports on their con-
dition will be made. They may object orally or in writing to their
139. Id.
140. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135-36 (1977). See note 70 supra.
141. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. at 2527.
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hospitalization, and if they do so, the director of the facility has to inform
them of their right to a hearing and provide them with the telephone
number of an attorney. Mentally retarded children over thirteen and men-
tally ill children under fourteen, therefore, have the burden of objecting to
their hospitalization. 4 2 It is unrealistic, however, to expect such initiative
from each child without the aid of a state-appointed representative.
143
The distinction in the Pennsylvania procedures between children of dif-
ferent ages reflects degrees of parental authority over a child depending on
the child's capacity to make independent decisions for himself. 14 4 There is
a basis in common law 14 5 as well as in psychology 146 for allowing children
increased self-determination around the age of fourteen. If the basis for
procedural protection is purely intellectual capacity, however, then men-
tally incompetent adults as well as incompetent children could arguably be
denied formal due process when they are committed by family mem-
bers.147 As the courts have explained, individuals in more helpless situa-
tions with less ability to voice their own concerns require more, not less,
procedural protection.'48 Since institutionalization can have a profound
effect on the young impressionable child and the risk of an erroneous diag-
nosis is significantly greater in the very early years of a child's life,
149
stricter procedures are required to safeguard the young child's broad lib-
erty interest. Thus, young children as well as older children require at
142. Id at 2527.
143. As Justice Brennan stated, such action would be "no more than a hollow ritual."
Id at 2529 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. While some legislatures have provided procedural protections for all ages, see, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2A-13 (Supp. 1976-77), others have given them only to older minors.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.23.070 (Supp. 1977). Recently the California
Supreme Court, while reserving judgment on what rights younger children have, chose to
provide hearings for children 14 and older alleged to be mentally ill. In re Roger S., 19 Cal.
3d. 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). See note 102 supra.
145. The ages of 7, 14, and 21 have been used since early common law days as indicators
of legal maturity. Under English common law, for example, children under seven were
totally exempted from criminal sanctions. Children between seven and fourteen were pre-
sumed to lack criminal capacity unless mental maturity on their part was demonstrated. For
children over 14, unless incapacity was proved, they were presumed responsible for their
crimes. See N. KITTRIE,SUpra note 7, at 108.
146. See D. ELKIND, CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 97-104 (2d ed. 1974); B. INHELDER
& J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE
334-37 (1958).
147. But see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
148. One author has attributed the inadequacy of legal representation for children to
their lack of money, insensitivity on the part of the bar to recognize conflicts of interest
between parent and child, and the child's ignorance of the need for or the availability of
legal representation. Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 106.
149. See note 96 supra.
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least an independent advocate to represent their interests after hospital ad-
mission.
A final factor to be weighed in determining appropriate postadmission
procedures is the state's interest. Fiscal constraints and the administrative
burden of new or substitute procedural protections are important govern-
mental considerations when dealing with a limited source of allocated
funds. 5° An example of this trade-off in allocating funds for new proce-
dural protections would be the cost of diverting professionals from treat-
ment to participation in postadmission hearings. Flexible procedures,
however, can reduce such costs. The type of hearing envisioned by the
appellees in both Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles, for example,
could take place within the hospital as an administrative proceeding,
thereby saving time and providing convenience to hospital personnel.' 5 '
Moreover, institutional psychiatrists currently take part in commitment
proceedings for adults, and additional tasks for the commitment of chil-
dren in light of broad waiver provisions would not represent a substantial
burden. 1
52
Another valid state interest lies in preserving parental autonomy. If the
courts are to preserve this autonomy, however, it is important to outline
the parameters of a parent's authority over his or her children.'53 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has never established any guidelines on this
issue and has addressed the circumstances of each case individually to de-
termine the nature and extent of a child's right.'5 4 The underlying ratio-
nales on which the state has supported parental authority in the past have
been: promotion of the child's welfare; parental privilege; social pluralism;
and family autonomy."'
These rationales, however, are inapplicable in the postadmission con-
text. At this stage, the child has been removed from the family and is in
the care of the state. The child has often come into the state's custody
because the parent has either lost control over the child or feels inadequate
150. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 92 supra.
151. Even if judicial review were required of the administrative decision, the number of
such appeals would most likely be minimal in light of the waiver provisions.
152. Current waiver provisions leave a great deal to be desired. Extreme reliance is
placed on the child's advocate to proceed or not to proceed to a hearing since the child will
often be incapable of asserting his or her own rights.
153. See notes 4, 32 supra.
154. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1975).
155. A discussion of these rationales is found in The Mental Hosfpitalization of Children
and the Limits of ParentalAuthority, 88 YALE L.J. 186, 194-209 (1978).
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to meet fully the child's needs. 56 At this point, therefore, parental control
should be subordinate to the child's broad liberty interest and the state's
duty to protect the child from a continuing erroneous commitment.
Because of the fundamental liberty interest involved, postadmission pro-
cedures should follow the directives of the lower courts in Institutionalized
Juveniles and require notice, presence at the commitment hearing, ap-
pointed counsel, cross-examination of witnesses, the opportunity to offer
evidence in one's own behalf, and a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof. Ex parte procedures which deny some type of meaningful hearing
to children faced with continuing institutional confinement rely too heav-
ily on "benevolent" motivations' 57 and ignore the child's status as a
human being entitled to fundamental notions of fairness."'
The effect of formal postadmission procedural protections for "voluntar-
ily" committed minors would probably be a decrease in the number of
institutionalized children in state-run facilities. For most of these children,
the state can provide modes of treatment less restrictive than institutional-
ization. Community-based treatment is often more appropriate clinically
and is certainly more responsive to the child's liberty interest.'59 Institu-
tionalization is an expensive and often detrimental way to deal with the
mentally impaired and emotionally troubled. 6 ° Normalization efforts
fully supported by the community would not only be less expensive in the
long run16 1 but would undoubtedly be more successful in terms of en-
abling the individual to lead the most productive life possible.'
62
156. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157. See notes 16-77 and accompanying text supra.
158. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1966).
159. Over half of the mentally ill children confined in Georgia institutions would not
need hospitalization if other forms of care were available in the community. See J.L. & J.R.
v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 122 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
160. For a description of some of the alternatives to institutionalization for the mentally
retarded, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD (1973); Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of
Normalization, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499, 505-514 (M.
Kindred ed. 1976).
161. See J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 126 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
162. Even if conditions improve, maintaining children in institutions rather than provid-
ing less restrictive alternatives would run contrary to normalization efforts. As one commen-
tator has stated: "[Tihe trend is, and must be, toward more temporary placement,
community care, and fewer 'life sentences."' Ennis, Reaction Comment, Due Process in Civil
Commitment and Elsewhere, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 476, 484




Voluntary commitment of minors to institutions by their parents without
formal procedural protections raises the strong possibility of erroneous
deprivation of the child's liberty interest. Although concerns and interests
of the parent may legitimately factor into the due process balancing, the
individual faced with the effects of institutionalization is the child. Ex-
treme deference by the courts to the will of the parent and the diagnostic
powers of the psychiatric profession deprives a child of the standard proce-
dural protections afforded other groups faced with less serious constitu-
tional infringements. Children committed by their parents are not
"volunteering" to be institutionalized in any sense of the word. The fact
that they are young and often incapable of asserting their own rights does
not obviate the need to assure that the drastic measure of institutionaliza-
tion is appropriate for the particular child. The protections of the judicial
process, which could in large part be waived by the child and his or her
representative, would allow flexibility in commitment proceedings while
providing sufficient means to contest inappropriate commitment efforts
when necessary.
If institutionalization were made an alternative to be exercised only
when absolutely necessary, the emphasis would shift to creation of more
community-based alternatives. Although the judiciary can take limited
steps to compel the states to create and fund viable alternatives and must
continue to safeguard the constitutional rights of the individual, ultimately
it is the states and their citizens who must restructure their attitudes toward
the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. The long-held view that those
deviating from society should be committed and isolated from society must
change if added procedural protections are to meet with any long-term
success.
The Court's deference to parental authority and psychiatric diagnoses in
Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles is understandable in the preadmis-
sion setting. If, however, children are not given the opportunity to contest
erroneous commitments soon after their admission, they will be unjustly
deprived of their liberty by their parents and the state. What appears to be
a return to the benevolent parenspatriae model at the expense of procedu-
ral rights could potentially erode not only the rights of children but also
the rights of incompetent or emotionally unstable adults.
Barbara C Joseph
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